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THE SOUTHERN INVASION BEGINS
The Plan for regaining the South was to be carried out at last. Lord George Germain had written to General Sir Henry Clinton that at the proper time he should order General Prevost to attack the southern frontiers “while Mr. Stuart brings down a large body of Indians towards Augusta.” By November, the British invasion force was ready to sail from New York; the proper time had arrived. Never before had coordination between Stuart and the military been more crucial. Unfortunately, poor communication and Stuart’s age and poor health conspired to disrupt this coordination. In a letter to Germain of December 4, Stuart showed no awareness that he was supposed to have the Indians ready for the great offensive. David Taitt would later testify that Stuart first learned that the invasion was under way in the latter part of January in a letter from Governor Tonyn dated December 16th. A number of factors were at work against the British plan. As stated earlier, Stuart was ill during November and December 1778. George Galphin introduced confusion into the Indian country with another of his conferences in November. It could be argued that the man principally responsible for not giving Stuart his orders in time was General Augustine Prevost. Prevost had a professional soldier’s disdain for Indian warfare and never showed any enthusiasm for the plan. John Stuart also knew Indians too well to believe that they could be held in check when the lust of battle was upon them so he temporized and the plan was undercut at the moment it should have been implemented. The troops would be sent but the Indians would not act in concert with them. On December 28, 1778, Campbell’s force of 3,000 British, Hessians, and Loyalists landed and overwhelmed the defenders of Savannah. On January 2, 1779 they took Ebenezer and then on January 22 began the march toward Augusta. Leading this advance were Thomas Brown and his East Florida Rangers. Campbell’s march led him past Silver Bluff, the home of George Galphin. He sent a message to Galphin inviting him to persuade the Indians to remain neutral. Campbell, of course, did not really want the Indians to remain quiet because he expected to meet them in Augusta. The British scouts sent to spy on Galphin intercepted a message which Campbell interpreted as encouraging the Creeks to war. Campbell decided to hold 90 of Galphin’s slaves as hostages against Galphin’s good behavior. Actually Campbell accomplished more than he realized. Galphin was about to resume trade with the Creeks at his post at Old Town on the Ogeechee during January. A month earlier ten head men, including Opeitley Mico of Tallasee and the Cussita King, had called on Galphin and asked him to reopen the trading path. Galphin had long favored the resumption of trade but was hampered by a chronic shortage of supplies and the open hostility of the Georgians toward Indians. “The people upon the frontiers threatened to kill me and the Indians too if I supplied them,” he wrote in a letter. Galphin was convinced that the settlers, not John Stuart, were responsible for bringing continual raids upon the frontier. On January 31, 1779 the British forces liberated Augusta from Rebel control. During the first week of the British occupation of Augusta, the plan seemed to be working out as expected. Campbell had every reason to believe that Indians from the west and Loyalists from the east were on the way to join him. In fact, both were. Campbell counted eleven hundred men who came in to take the oath of allegiance to the king. They were formed into twenty militia companies . Meanwhile, the residents of Wilkes County were aware that Indians were approaching and humbly asked for protection. Campbell guaranteed their security in an address circulated through the backcountry. How the Indians were supposed to distinguish between friend and foe was a basic problem for the British plan. Campbell sent a letter to his Creek allies to caution them not to wage war on the people living on the Georgia side of the Savannah River. By early March, Lord Germain could not control his concern about how the plan was working out. He assumed that Campbell would gather “very considerable numbers” at Augusta and attack into South Carolina while Clinton would send “timely reinforcements” before General Washington could do anything On March 13, he wrote to General Prevost expressing surprise that he had heard nothing of the Indians. He understood that John Stuart had the Indians ready to cooperate whenever they were needed. He could only hope that they were on their way to Augusta to meet Campbell. At the same time, Indians were in General Prevost’s thoughts. From his camp in Ebenezer, he wrote the Creek chiefs warning them not to wage war on Georgians or on women and children anywhere. The Rebel men in Carolina, however, were valid targets. The Indians could distinguish friendly Loyalists because they would wear a red cross in their hats as well as a pine brush. The Americans were just as anxious about where the Indians were. It was assumed by almost all that no white of any age or sex would be safe if the Indians went to war. David Taitt was the one that the imposible task fell to. In spite of Germain’s orders to be ready to move, John Stuart was too focused on his own problems, too far away in Pensacola, and too sick to carry out his responsibilities. Stuart ordered Taitt on February 1st to collect the Upper Creeks and march to Augusta to meet Campbell. The entire month was spent organizing an attack force. Already on the March, Taitt received Campbell’s orders that Indians not attack Georgians. With serious misgivings, Taitt and 25-five white traders lead more than 400 Creeks to the Ogeechee. On March 25th Prevost’s letter reached Taitt. The ridiculous scheme for distinguishing friend from foe further discouraged Taitt. Taitt burned an abandoned fort and turned the Indians loose to raid Carolina, Taitt, Alexander McGillivray, and a few Upper Creeks joined the British in Savannah, as did William McIntosh with about 50 Lower Creeks. One party of Creeks, under the exceptional leadership of Emistisiguo, crossed the Savannah and caused alarms all up and down the Carolina frontier. Alexander Cameron made an effort to recruit Cherokees to join Campbell, but they set off on March 30, much too late to be of any use to Campbell’s mission. Lord Germain probably described the execution of the plan best when he wrote, ”No part of this plan was executed as it was expected it would have been.” Germain would have liked to have placed the blame on Stuart but death protected him from playing the scapegoat. Alexander Cameron informed Germain that Colonel Stuart died on Sunday, March 21, after an illness of several months. Cameron and Charles Stuart volunteered to handle Indian affairs until a successor was appointed.
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