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THE PLAN FAILS Cornwallis’ decision to resort to Indian warfare in North Carolina brought an immediate reaction from the Americans. During the winter of 1780-81 Col. John Sevier and Arthur Campbell, leading the North Carolina and Virginia militias destroyed more than a thousand Cherokee Houses and fifty-thousand bushels of corn. In January 1781 General Nathaniel Green, dangerously short of men, instructed the mountain leaders to make peace with the Cherokees and join his army. The Cherokees were not beaten yet however. In February they went on the warpath again and the mountaineers retaliated with even fiercer attacks. Brown complained that the whites were more savage than any Indians he knew claiming men, women and children had been thrown into flames, impaled, or butchered alive during the destruction of 13 Cherokee towns. In late April 1781, some of the Cherokee sued for peace blaming the “bad situation” on Brown. The situation in the west, for Cameron, was equally bad. A superior Spanish force besieged Pensacola in March and April, and the British commander surrendered the city on May 8. Alexander Cameron decided to join Brown in Augusta and administer Indian affairs jointly. With Pensacola under Spanish control, Augusta was the most important link between the British and the western tribes. Brown, in the meantime, completed his fortification (Fort Cornwallis) in Augusta hoping to discourage the Rebels and encourage the loyalist militia to behave more reliably. Unfortunately, this was not the case. In January Brown, learning of the ambush of a mixed Ranger/militia patrol by rebels under James McKay, led a force of 250 Rangers and Indians and 100 militia in pursuit. McKay had joined with a large number of South Carolinians under Col. William Hardin and this group attacked Brown’s force while they were encamped at Wiggan’s plantation. The first attack came shortly after midnight from the left side of the camp. The militia fled into camp in great disorder while the Rangers formed into line and repulsed the attack. The next morning Hardin attacked once again, this time from the right. The remaining loyal militia fled, some joining the other side, while Brown ordered his Rangers and Indians to mount up and charge. This time Harden’s men scattered, many seeking refuge in the swamps and were “principally indebted to the speed of their horses for their escape.” Creeks, Chickasaws, and Cherokees were with Brown in this fight against Harden and Dog King and the Far Off King, both of the Cussetas, were killed in this engagement. Among the prisoners taken by Brown he found 12 men who had previously accepted parole and they were hung on the spot. Lord Germaine, unaware of the true conditions in the backcountry, informed Brown that he expected war parties from Canada to attack the rebel frontiers. He directed Brown to have the Cherokees cooperate with them, the object being to keep the frontiersmen from joining Greene’s army. The Cherokee had expended themselves in the campaigns against the mountain settlements during the winter, but Brown was able to send the Upper Creeks, led by Emistisiguo, to harass the rebel settlements at Long Island, and along the Watauga and Holsten rivers. With Cornwallis chasing Greene in North Carolina and Virginia, things in South Carolina and Georgia began to deteriorate. Rebels seemed to “come out of the woodwork” but, in fact, it was the long arm of Nathanael Greene directing events. In early March, Green sent Andrew Pickens south with the South Carolina and Georgia troops. In April he sent Lt. Col. Henry “Lighthorse Harry” Lee, with three companies of cavalry, three companies of light infantry, and Major Eaton’s North Carolina infantry with orders to “cooperate” with General Pickens. Meanwhile, on April 16, 1781, the scattered bands of rebel raiders gathered on the Little River. Elijah Clarke was recovering from an attack of smallpox so Lt. Col. Micajah Williamson assumed command. They advanced to the outskirts of Augusta and began a siege although the lack of artillery and supplies hampered their effectiveness. On May 1, Brown reported to Col von Porbeck, the Hessian commander of the Savannah garrison, that he was besieged by about 80 mounted militia on the Carolina side of the river and four to five hundred cavalry on the Georgia side. Brown prepared for a possible siege. The public stores were located at the late George Galphin’s stockade at Silver bluff and he detached a company of Rangers to guard them and move supplies and ammunition to Augusta by night and thus was well supplied with ammunition. Ranger officers were sent out to seek help from the Cherokee and the Creeks but the Cherokee were “discouraged” by the losses they had suffered fighting the mountaineers while the Creeks were mostly away on the Pensacola campaign. A party of Rangers and Indians were ambushed at the Widow Bugg’s plantation at New Savannah and those taken prisoner were executed. Thus, in early May, all eyes turned to Augusta. Fort Cornwallis stood near the river on the western edge of town. A long, narrow lagoon flowed westerly along the south side of town and emptied into the river about ½ mile from the Fort. The main street crossed the lagoon gully on a bridge. On the west side of that gully stood Col James Grierson’s fortified house. Pickens arrived opposite Augusta but lacked arms and ammunition. Clarke was well enough by May 15 to resume command of the Georgia militia outside of town. Lee covered the 75 miles to Augusta in 3 days; his infantry and dragoons alternating on horseback. On May 19 Brown led a sally out of the fort that scattered the Georgia and Carolina militia. Reports of this engagement claim that the Rangers killed upward of 90 and took at least 80 horses. Brown planned another attack on May 20th but Col. Grierson sent a note asking Brown to postpone the attack as the Americans were infiltrating the gully between Grierson’s fort and Fort Cornwallis and he was planning to keep a strong force in the gully that night. Lee decided to concentrate on Fort Galphin first and reached Silver Bluff on May 21. Lee ordered the militia to attack and then feign a retreat in order to draw the Rangers out of the fort. The ruse worked, with the Rangers being defeated, and then the South Carolina Royal Militia remaining in the fort were quickly overcome. The prize was incredibly rich as the fort contained not only the public stores but also Indian presents and supplies – guns, ammunition, blankets, tools, and medicine. Without the stores captured at Fort Galphin the subsequent Battle of Augusta could not have been fought. Pickens, who had been begging for supplies at the end of April, was suddenly in the position of being able to send supplies to Greene.
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